NATO Needs to Tear Down One More Wall
NATO's 60th Anniversary summit on April 3 and 4 is an excellent possibility to make a firm commitment to improve the alliance's relations with Russia. They cannot afford to worsen any further, outstandingly since NATO needs Russia's relief to solve important global problems, such as Afghanistan, nuclear nonproliferation and energy charters. This synergism, however, will not be easy in light of the difficult legacy of nearly a century of division and mistrust between the two centers of power.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin suggested that NATO was trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on Russia. "These walls may be virtual, but they are despite that dividing," he said.
This idea of a divided Europe goes back much further than 1949, when NATO was formed. It can be dated to the end of the World War I in 1918. The geopolitical reality of a bipolar division between the Western allies and Russia was quickly surfacing.
With the 1917 Revolution and the successive buildup of the Red Army, the leading Western powers decided that the best solution to the new threat was to attract Russia's buffer states into a military defense pact to preclude the further expansion of Bolshevism.
In a 1920 protocol of the allied representatives in Paris, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George asked French Marshal Ferdinand Foch about the unsteady military situation in Russia's border states: "Do you propose a military entente between these different states with the object of attacking [Russia], or ... with the object of a common defense in case of a [Russian] attack?" Foch responded that the first priority was establishing a defensive categorization to protect Europe against Russian advances. This alliance would include Poland, the Baltic states and Caucasus countries. Nearly 100 years later, these "buffer states" are the very ones in the midst of a tug-of-war between Russia and NATO.
If NATO is serious about reconciliation with Russia, Western countries must appreciate that NATO cannot expand its military presence in Russia's periphery while excluding Russia. This would only prolong the century-long rivalry.
NATO has said many times that it needs Russia's help on solving important global problems, but this is possible only if NATO treats the Kremlin's strategic and security interests seriously -- above all in Russia's own backyard.
Munir Jawed is an American Fulbright scholar in Baku.
At the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, then-President Vladimir Putin suggested that NATO was trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on Russia. "These walls may be virtual, but they are despite that dividing," he said.
This idea of a divided Europe goes back much further than 1949, when NATO was formed. It can be dated to the end of the World War I in 1918. The geopolitical reality of a bipolar division between the Western allies and Russia was quickly surfacing.
With the 1917 Revolution and the successive buildup of the Red Army, the leading Western powers decided that the best solution to the new threat was to attract Russia's buffer states into a military defense pact to preclude the further expansion of Bolshevism.
In a 1920 protocol of the allied representatives in Paris, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George asked French Marshal Ferdinand Foch about the unsteady military situation in Russia's border states: "Do you propose a military entente between these different states with the object of attacking [Russia], or ... with the object of a common defense in case of a [Russian] attack?" Foch responded that the first priority was establishing a defensive categorization to protect Europe against Russian advances. This alliance would include Poland, the Baltic states and Caucasus countries. Nearly 100 years later, these "buffer states" are the very ones in the midst of a tug-of-war between Russia and NATO.
If NATO is serious about reconciliation with Russia, Western countries must appreciate that NATO cannot expand its military presence in Russia's periphery while excluding Russia. This would only prolong the century-long rivalry.
NATO has said many times that it needs Russia's help on solving important global problems, but this is possible only if NATO treats the Kremlin's strategic and security interests seriously -- above all in Russia's own backyard.
Munir Jawed is an American Fulbright scholar in Baku.
