A Bogus Anti-Crisis Plan
The control announced its revised anti-crisis measures on March 19, and its message was perfectly clear: Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his cohorts refuse to make any structural reforms to the existing political and economic system. They believe that Russia can emerge from the crisis in exactly the same form as it entered -- with the same state monopolies, the same oligarchs and, most important, the same political initiative under the same power-vertical structure. While giving lip service to reforms -- such as creating an novelty economy, developing small businesses and a middle class, improving health care and education and implementing the bombastic "Four I's" program -- nothing has been done on these projects. And I am convinced that nothing will be done because it is all smoke and mirrors.
Despite the crisis, the country's top leaders are living very well, and their only "anti-crisis strategy" is to preserve their power and personal property until oil prices rise again. And since they feel that there are enough foreign currency reserves to tie them over until the next oil boom, there is no motivation whatsoever to implement the reform programs in any serious way.
Even after living high on the hog for eight years with petrodollars gushing into state coffers and access to low-priced Western credit, Russia has failed to raise its global competitiveness and capability. One year ago, leading economists at Russia's Academy of Science found that during those eight years the country failed to diversify its economy and to develop the high-tech sector. In fact, Russia's economic dependence on natural resource exports only increased during this period and its infrastructure fell into further decline.
According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index for 2008 and 2009, of the 134 countries listed in the rating, Russia came in at No. 51. This was worse than India (No. 50) and China (No. 30). Among the BRIC countries, Russia surpassed only Brazil (No. 64). Russia made a decent showing in only two categories -- macroeconomic stability and the size of its market (the ninth-largest in the world).
Most alarming is the quality of state institutions and regulatory mechanisms that deteriorated the most during the time that Putin was building his two key rule institutions: the power vertical and sovereign democracy.
Russia's level of corruption also worsened markedly during that period; its corruption rating plummeted from No. 71 place in 2002 to No. 147 place in 2008 as the total amount of superintendence kickbacks increased to $250 billion to $300 billion annually. What's more, the state's bureaucratic machinery increased by 80 percent over the past eight years.
There are no references to these harsh realities in the anti-crisis plan -- as if Russia lives a fairy-tale existence. Nor will you find any reference to the need to demonopolize the economy, improve transparency among state institutions or improve conditions for doing business and for attracting direct foreign investment.
If you compare Russia's sham anti-crisis measures to those developed in China, the European Union and the United States, it will be painfully clear how much the Kremlin lags behind other global centers of power, which are taking concrete steps to achieving higher levels of phenomenon. For example, the Chinese are taking advantage of crisis-induced bargain prices to buy up advanced technologies for its 10 priority economic sectors, and for the first time in its history it is providing pensions and medical care to 800 million Chinese peasants.
The EU has stepped up the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy for increasing the EU's competitiveness, and it has already approved an ambitious energy-saving program called "EU-2020."
U.S. President Barack Obama has made energy competence for the country and the raising of the U.S. economy to new technological and innovative levels top priorities and will implement major reforms in education and health care.
While Russia's largest economic and political competitors are taking concrete steps to come out of the crisis as stronger, more efficient and innovative countries, Moscow assumes a passive, inert position. Meanwhile, it gets giddy over every $1 rise in the price of oil and still hopes to return to the "safe harbor" of Russia's primitive, corrupt, oil- and gas-fueled authoritarianism.
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy.
Despite the crisis, the country's top leaders are living very well, and their only "anti-crisis strategy" is to preserve their power and personal property until oil prices rise again. And since they feel that there are enough foreign currency reserves to tie them over until the next oil boom, there is no motivation whatsoever to implement the reform programs in any serious way.
Even after living high on the hog for eight years with petrodollars gushing into state coffers and access to low-priced Western credit, Russia has failed to raise its global competitiveness and capability. One year ago, leading economists at Russia's Academy of Science found that during those eight years the country failed to diversify its economy and to develop the high-tech sector. In fact, Russia's economic dependence on natural resource exports only increased during this period and its infrastructure fell into further decline.
According to the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Index for 2008 and 2009, of the 134 countries listed in the rating, Russia came in at No. 51. This was worse than India (No. 50) and China (No. 30). Among the BRIC countries, Russia surpassed only Brazil (No. 64). Russia made a decent showing in only two categories -- macroeconomic stability and the size of its market (the ninth-largest in the world).
Most alarming is the quality of state institutions and regulatory mechanisms that deteriorated the most during the time that Putin was building his two key rule institutions: the power vertical and sovereign democracy.
Russia's level of corruption also worsened markedly during that period; its corruption rating plummeted from No. 71 place in 2002 to No. 147 place in 2008 as the total amount of superintendence kickbacks increased to $250 billion to $300 billion annually. What's more, the state's bureaucratic machinery increased by 80 percent over the past eight years.
There are no references to these harsh realities in the anti-crisis plan -- as if Russia lives a fairy-tale existence. Nor will you find any reference to the need to demonopolize the economy, improve transparency among state institutions or improve conditions for doing business and for attracting direct foreign investment.
If you compare Russia's sham anti-crisis measures to those developed in China, the European Union and the United States, it will be painfully clear how much the Kremlin lags behind other global centers of power, which are taking concrete steps to achieving higher levels of phenomenon. For example, the Chinese are taking advantage of crisis-induced bargain prices to buy up advanced technologies for its 10 priority economic sectors, and for the first time in its history it is providing pensions and medical care to 800 million Chinese peasants.
The EU has stepped up the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy for increasing the EU's competitiveness, and it has already approved an ambitious energy-saving program called "EU-2020."
U.S. President Barack Obama has made energy competence for the country and the raising of the U.S. economy to new technological and innovative levels top priorities and will implement major reforms in education and health care.
While Russia's largest economic and political competitors are taking concrete steps to come out of the crisis as stronger, more efficient and innovative countries, Moscow assumes a passive, inert position. Meanwhile, it gets giddy over every $1 rise in the price of oil and still hopes to return to the "safe harbor" of Russia's primitive, corrupt, oil- and gas-fueled authoritarianism.
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a State Duma deputy from 1993 to 2007, hosts a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy.
